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One of the aims of the WHO Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines (GAP) was to transfer influenza
vaccine production technology to interested manufacturers and governments in developing countries,
to enable greater influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity against any pandemic threat or pandemic.
For this objective, the GAP was supported by an independent Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to assist
WHO to select vaccine manufacturing proposals for funding and to provide programmatic support for
successful grantees. While there were many challenges, for both the TAG and grantees, there were also
notable successes with an additional capacity of 338–600 million pandemic vaccine doses being made
possible by the programme between 2007 and 2015, and a potential capacity of more than 600 million
by 2016/17 with up to one billion doses expected by 2018/19. Seasonal vaccine production was also
developed in 4 countries with another 4–5 countries expected to be producing seasonal vaccine by
2018/19. The relatively small WHO investments – in time and funding – made in these companies to
develop their own influenza vaccine production facilities have had quite dramatic results.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Influenza viruses provide a constant disease threat to humanity
in the form of regular seasonal epidemics, novel pandemic threats
and pandemics of varying severity. The burden of disease varies
from region to region and year to year, and the health and eco-
nomic consequences of this disease are profound. To be prepared
for these occurrences requires global cooperation and the interac-
tion of many private and public stakeholders including manufac-
turers, researchers, health providers, policy makers, expert
committees and specialist laboratories, as well as the guidance of
health authorities, regulators and international organisations such
the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO provides a number of
essential programmes, policies, and committees related to influ-
enza such as the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR),
including IHR emergency committees; the WHO Strategic Advisory
Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE); and more recently the
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, which focuses
on equity in virus sharing and benefit sharing [1]. Importantly,
there is also WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance and ResponseSystem (GISRS), which brings together over 140 laboratories in a
world-wide influenza virus surveillance network responsible for
virus characterisation, risk assessment, virus sharing, and ulti-
mately the selection and production of candidate vaccine viruses.
This network is essential for alerting the world of any emerging
influenza threats and for the eventual provision of seasonal and
pandemic vaccines by manufacturers [2]. However, despite this
global effort, it has been recognised for some time that in the event
of a pandemic there would be a significant shortfall of available
pandemic vaccine as demand would be far greater than supply.
The re-emergence of H5N1 in Southeast Asia in 2005 focused the
world’s attention on these issues, with developing countries calling
for greater vaccine production capacity in their own regions and
for more equitable benefit sharing. Moreover, it was also clear that
low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) would be the most
affected by any pandemic influenza threat. Therefore, in 2006,
the WHO published a Global Action Plan for Influenza Vaccines
(GAP), which is a comprehensive strategy to reduce the present
global shortage of influenza vaccine. One of its objectives involved
the transferring of influenza vaccine production technology to
interested manufacturers and governments in LMICs, to enable
local and overall increased influenza vaccine manufacturing capac-
ity when a pandemic threat or actual pandemic occurs [3].
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In 2007, an independent Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was
formed to assist WHO in selecting vaccine manufacturers’ propos-
als for funding under the GAP. Each TAG member brought with
them considerable expertise in a variety of areas including influ-
enza vaccine development, vaccine production, biotechnology,
and/or relevant regulatory experience, which allowed the commit-
tee to understand the challenges ahead for both the grantees and
the WHO and to give appropriate advice. Table 1 lists current
and former members of the TAG.
In the initial phases, developing country vaccine manufacturers
were invited to submit letters of intent, via a public invitation on
the WHO website, declaring their interest in developing influenza
pandemic vaccine capacity. These letters were reviewed against
several criteria including public health value, potential regional
impact, technical merit, the level of government support and prob-
ability of success. As described previously [4], eligible manufactur-
ers were then invited to submit full proposals, which were scored,
ranked and weighted by TAG members according to an evaluation
of five elements: the project plan, the staffing and management
plan, performance measures, an understanding of the require-
ments, and the budget justification. An ongoing programmatic
review was also instituted for the successful grantees involving
regular site audits, a review of government (and other) support,Table 1
Current⁄ and previous members of the TAG.
TAG member Particular expertise
John Boslego Vaccine production
Rick Bright⁄ Biotechnology
Armen Donabedian Biotechnology
Donald Francis⁄ Production of viral vaccines
Gary Grohmann⁄ Influenza vaccine and vaccine
Michael Perdue Influenza vaccine
James Robertson⁄ Influenza vaccine
Jean-François Saluzzo Production of viral vaccines
Jaspal Sokhey⁄ Regulatory issues and Vaccine
Thomas Warf⁄ Vaccine production
Gerd Zettlmeissl⁄ Biotechnology and vaccine pr
Table 2
List of WHO grantees by country, manufacturer, private/public status, and technology/pro
Country Institute (Legal status) Technology
2007 grantees
Brazil Instituto Butantan (Public) Egg-based inactivated s
India Serum Institute of India (Private) Egg-based technologies:
influenza vaccine using
using Russian technolog
Indonesia Bio Farma (Public) Egg-based split vaccine.
Mexico Birmex (Public) Egg-based split vaccine.
Thailand Government Pharmaceutical
Organization (Public)
Egg-based technologies:
(ii) live attenuated influ
Viet Nam Institute of Vaccines and
Medical Biologicals (Public)
Egg-derived whole virio
2009 grantees
Egypt Vacsera (Public) Egg-derived whole virio
Islamic Republic of Iran Razi Institute (Public) Egg-based vaccines
Republic of Korea Green Cross Corporation
(Private)
Alum adjuvanted whole
Romania Cantacuzino Institute (Public) Pilot-scale production o
Serbia Torlak (Public) Egg-based inactivated v
2011 grantees
Kazakhstan RIBSP (Public) Egg based whole virion
South Africa Biovac (Public/Private
partnership)
A fill-finish facility for s
2013 grantees
China BCHT (Private) Egg-based technologies:sustainability, an assessment of Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMP) and biosafety requirements, a review of the results of
research andmethod development, a review of data on vaccine pro-
duction and clinical trials, and an assessment of progress towards
registration of a pandemic vaccine. TAG members also reviewed
the quarterly reports submitted to WHO by the grantees and held
regular teleconferences in addition to the annual face-to-face TAG
meetings. TAG meetings were often held at one of the grantee sites
to provide an opportunity for direct consultation. Over the life of
the programme 14 manufacturers were given financial support
over four review processes in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 (Table 2).
The Institute of Experimental Medicine (IEM), St. Petersburg, Rus-
sian Federation was also given financial support for research and
development of live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV) candi-
dates and the reconstruction of its laboratory. In total, approxi-
mately US$50 million was allocated by the WHO to grantees.3. Challenges
Most of the countries involved had never manufactured influ-
enza vaccine and did not have an established influenza vaccine
delivery programme. Therefore proposals had to be developed for
building production facilities as well as for eventual vaccine deliv-
ery. It became clear from a manufacturing and quality perspectiveMembership
From 2007–October 2014
From June 2011
From December 2008–June 2011
From 2007
registration From 2007
From December 2008–April 2013
From 2007
From 2007–November 2014
production From 2007
From September 2013
oduction From June 2011
duct developed.
plit and/or whole virion H5N1 with adjuvant
(i) whole virion alum-adjuvanted inactivated vaccine, and (ii) live attenuated
WHO sublicensed Russian technology. Cell-based technologies: live attenuated
y
Cell-based technologies
Fill-finish facility
(i) establishment of an egg-based split inactivated seasonal vaccine process, and
enza vaccine using WHO sublicensed Russian technology
n and alum adjuvanted H5N1 and H1N1 influenza vaccines. Split seasonal vaccine
n vaccine
virion H5N1 vaccine
f seasonal egg-based inactivated split influenza vaccine
accines
and split virion vaccines
easonal vaccine: split egg-based product
live attenuated influenza vaccine using WHO sublicensed Russian technology
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5422 G. Grohmann et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 5420–5424that the development of seasonal vaccines would logically precede
the development of pandemic vaccine. This would ensure that all
the manufacturing processes and associated quality and consis-
tency issues would be in place, so that pandemic vaccine could
be reliably produced when needed. Moreover, from a vaccine deliv-
ery perspective, government policies and appropriate infrastruc-
ture needed to be in place as part of pandemic preparedness.
Manufacturers were encouraged to communicate frequently with
regulatory authorities and relevant health and other government
ministries to ensure that such programmes were in place. More-
over, grantees were encouraged to consider and develop local
and regional markets and obtain contracts for seasonal and pan-
demic vaccine production.
The complexities of influenza vaccine manufacture are unique
and can be fickle. On WHO’s advice, grantees generally chose to
invest in egg-based production methods, and some later worked
with cell culture-based systems as well. Many wanted to begin
with pandemic vaccine production because of the H5 threat but
all were encouraged to establish pilot programmes and begin with
one or more seasonal vaccine viruses. As few of the grantees had
previous experience of influenza vaccine development and manu-
facture, they all required training and, for this purpose, WHO
established a centre of excellence and training at the Netherlands
Vaccine Institute (NVI) in Bilthoven. NVI established a pilot-scale
production process that could be transferred to manufacturers
[5]. Specific training modules were also provided by the following
institutions: the National Institute for Biological Standards and
Control (NIBSC) in the United Kingdom, the adjuvant technology
transfer hub at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland [6], the
Utah State University Center for Integrated Biosystems, and the
North Carolina State University Biomanufacturing Training and
Education Center (BTEC) in the USA.
To support egg-based production, most recipients had to build
both their own egg supply facilities and their own production fac-
tories. While many were successful in this venture, two companies
encountered unforeseen issues which either delayed or halted the
programme. Three grantees started with fill/finish facilities using
bulk vaccines supplied by other established manufacturers with
mixed success. Several grantees had issues with the splitting and
inactivating processes, procurement of equipment, quality control
and/or quality systems. Some companies lacked the financial
resources to continue smoothly with influenza production which
caused delays. Border control was also an issue for most grantees
as viruses and candidate vaccine viruses had to be correctly
acquired and handled in appropriate BSL2/3 conditions.
Apart from issues with seasonal vaccine production and secu-
rity, there were also challenges to producing clinical lots and clini-
cal protocols for pandemic vaccines. GMP was sometimes an issue
and the decisions aroundmaking split or whole virus vaccines, with
or without adjuvant, for clinical trials, as well as dose regimes,
required guidance from the TAG and local authorities. Several gran-
tees were successful in undertaking a number of clinical trials but
others struggled or failed to meet regulatory criteria. The TAG had
to bring in other consultants to help solve some specific problems
and also provide continuing advice to grantees on these issues.4. Successes
Feedback from the grantees indicated that the training courses
provided were instrumental for the successful implementation of
the projects. The grantees also highlighted the benefit of having
WHO involved, both via finance and expertise. Such involvement
provided intangible support, giving confidence to governments
and other funders of the high standard of the projects. Moreover,
independent external WHO reviews of the projects helped assure
G. Grohmann et al. / Vaccine 34 (2016) 5420–5424 5423companies and governments that their investments were reason-
ably managed and had a high probability of technical success.
These reviews also gave confidence to the local employees and
researchers working on the projects to continue to move forward
with their aim of producing influenza vaccines. In addition, it is
important to highlight that in nearly every case the WHO grants
were small in relation to the overall investment that companies
and/or governments made. The overall WHO investment of only
US$50 million leveraged a total of just under US$1 billion in fund-
ing by governments or other bodies. The vast majority of these
funds were invested in infrastructure by the grantees.
The overall success of the programme, in terms of vaccine pro-
duction, is summarised in Table 3, which lists the successful gran-
tees and the products produced over time as well as the projected
pandemic capacity of about 1 billion doses expected to be available
by 2019, pending the results of clinical trials in some cases. These
numbers are based on actual and expected seasonal vaccine pro-
duction and were derived from manufacturers themselves and
the opinions of the TAG members. The subsequent projections of
monovalent pandemic vaccine capacity is an estimate based on
three times the seasonal production capacity. If a billion doses
can be contributed at a time of crisis, then these grantees would
have contributed enormously to regional pandemic preparedness.
Moreover, H1N1 vaccines were also produced by several manufac-
turers and were approved in India, Korea, Romania, Thailand,
whereas H7N9 clinical lots were developed by manufacturers in
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Viet Nam. Nearly all manufac-
turers produced small amounts of H5N1 vaccine.
Some grantees chose to develop influenza production facilities
in partnership or collaborate with large international pharmaceuti-
cal companies (Instituto Butantan, Brazil and Birmex, Mexico with
Sanofi Pasteur; The Government Pharmaceutical Organization
(GPO), Thailand with Kaketsuken; Biovac, South Africa with
bioCSL; and Bio Farma, Indonesia with Biken). Independent of
WHO, these recipients have made their own business arrange-
ments with their technology transfer partner either to construct
production facilities or to share technologies involved in the pro-
duction, fill finish or other components of the larger production
process to produce influenza vaccines. Furthermore, the Serum
Institute of India (SII), GPO, and Changchun BCHT Biotechnology
Co. (BCHT) successfully collaborated with IEM to begin the produc-
tion of LAIVs.
5. Conclusions
The ultimate goal of this initiative was to increase access of safe,
effective and affordable pandemic influenza vaccines to developing
country populations. The successes have been impressive with an
expanded world capacity of an additional 338–600 million pan-
demic vaccine doses being made available between 2007 and
2015, and a potential capacity of more than 600 million by
2016/17 and up to one billion doses by 2018/19.Moreover, seasonal
vaccine production has already been developed in 4 countries with
another 4–5 countries expected to be producing seasonal vaccine
by 2018/19. Pandemic vaccine has also been developed in some
countries, notably against H1N1, H5N1 and H7N9. Challenges
remain for the successful grantees to keep moving forward with
their programmes and also for those still developing product to
continue to do so. To ensure ongoing success in the future, some
degree of technical support and training is still needed for all
the grantees and financial support for those hoping to produce vac-
cine in the future.
Much has happened in the last ten years with regard to pan-
demic influenza preparedness while WHO’s GAP was in progress.
WHO revised the IHR as well as established the PIP Framework,
which provides equity in virus and benefit sharing. There have alsobeen important meetings under the WHO GISRS umbrella [7],
notably consultations on improving influenza vaccine virus selec-
tion [8] and addressing the issues around switching from seasonal
to pandemic production during the start of a pandemic [9]. Also the
Nagoya Protocol, which provides equity in access and benefit shar-
ing to genetic resources, entered into force in 2014 [10]. Soon after
the establishment of the GAP a mild pandemic occurred in 2009
and there have subsequently been several pandemic threats - nota-
bly the emergence of H7N9, the re-emergence of H5N1, and late
emerging H1N1 and H3N2 genetic subgroups causing more severe
disease than expected.
There have also been technological advancements, with quadri-
valent seasonal vaccines, high dose seasonal vaccines, and new cell
culture vaccines coming onto the market as well as an influenza
vaccine made using recombinant technologies, which was success-
fully licensed in the USA [11]. Moreover, there have been advances
in dose sparing strategies including the development of adjuvants
and novel delivery systems, which are almost certainly necessary
to ensure the availability of enough pandemic vaccine for the
world [12–14]. The ability now to produce synthetic viruses from
genetic data will improve virus sharing and the production and
availability of candidate vaccine viruses. All these positive
advances, as well as the continuing global research effort, will help
the world to prepare for the next influenza pandemic threat.
Through the GAP programme and other WHO programmes and
resources, as well as the work of manufacturers and researchers,
the world is better prepared, and developing country regions are
now also better prepared, for any emerging influenza pandemic.
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